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Abstract
Recent work in economic geography has provided notable insights into the regional
implications of finance-driven capitalism. In particular, it has been argued that the
pressures created by the prioritisation of shareholder value and the rise of new
financial agents, such as private equity and hedge funds, are disembedding regional
social relations, and empirical evidence illustrates the devastating effects that the
short-term profit orientation of these agents can have on local economic development.
The relationship between a local economy’s integration into the global capitalist system
and its development performance is, however, more ambiguous than might be
expected. This article explores this connection in greater detail within the context of a
regional cluster, namely the film and TV industry cluster in Munich—one of the leading
centres for this type of industry in Germany—by means of addressing the adjustments
related to the entry of foreign investors after the insolvency of the Kirch Group in
2002. Initially, the research adds weight to the suspicion that financial agents erode
the long-term wealth- and employment-generating capacities of national corporations.
In addition, however, the results also reveal the dynamic restructuring processes
triggered by these players which, at least in the specific case investigated, provided
an acknowledged corrective and contributed to the cluster’s recent resurgence.
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1. Introduction
Criticising the greed and immorality of financial investors may appear not particularly
original these days. Even before the current economic crisis and the associated loss of
confidence in the global financial system there had been growing concern over the rise
of new financial agents such as foreign private equity and hedge funds and the
increasing power that these players hold over a significant part of a nation’s assets due
to the acquisition of a range of firms in important industries such as media (e.g. NZZ,
2006). The case of ProSiebenSat.1 Media AG, one of the two dominant private
broadcasting groups in Germany and of utmost importance within Munich’s media
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cluster, provides an excellent example of this trend. After the insolvency of the former
mother company of ProSiebenSat.1, the Kirch Group, in 2002, the corporation was
acquired by US media mogul Haim Saban who became the first major foreign investor
to enter the German media market. In 2006, Saban resold ProSiebenSat.1 after
substantial restructuring at a profit of more than E2 billion, and now a fund controlled
by two private equity firms, KKR and Permira, holds a majority stake in the
corporation. The latest developments have seen massive cost-cutting measures and an
apparent deterioration in programme quality leading to diminishing audience shares,
which, in turn, have resulted in reduced advertising revenues causing the stock price
to decline to historical lows. This tight situation notwithstanding, the executive and
supervisory boards of the group still proposed a marked increase in dividends in 2007
and distributed a payout to the shareholders that equals three times the net profits.
At first glance, the case of ProSiebenSat.1 appears to provide a clear illustration
of the consequences of what is seen by some as a specific paradigm in the global
capitalist system, also referred to as ‘financialisation’ (Froud et al., 2000; Williams,
2000; O’Neill, 2001; Epstein, 2005; Krippner, 2005; Leyshon and Thrift, 2007; Dore,
2008). As general trend to be found in most Western national economies (Engelen et al.,
2008a), financialisation is usually seen to imply increasing pressures for higher returns
on the capital employed. Recent work in economic geography has yielded valuable
insights into this development and the possible implications of finance-driven capitalism
for single industries and individual companies, including the undercutting of corporate
interests and alleged asset stripping as part of attempts to drive profitability, as well
as the damage to employment and, in turn, regional welfare (Christopherson, 2002;
Gibbon, 2002; Zeller, 2003; Pike, 2005). In particular, this work illustrates that the
growing power of capital markets and new financialised players, short-term profit
orientation and the paradigm of shareholder value tend to disembed regional social
relations and to have devastating effects for regional labour and supply markets.
However, the relationship between an economy’s integration into global financial
circuits and its development performance is, at best, not yet proven, and—depending
on case and context—more ambiguous than might be expected. Specifically, there is
a need for empirical research into the effects of economic financialisation beyond
nation-state centred analytics, such as into the interaction between global financial
expansion and the development of regional production or innovation systems (e.g.
Schamp, 2003; Thierstein, 2003; Zeller, 2003). The shortage of research into the impacts
of financialisation at a sub-national level relates to the fact that a significant part
of the literature regards financialisation as an isomorphic and generalised trend, in
which even national institutional particularities do not play a major role (Engelen, 2003,
2007; Engelen et al., 2008b; Clark and Wo´jcik, 2007). This in part is due to the origins
of financialisation studies in the discussion on globalisation, where it has aimed to
redress the state-versus-markets framework (Dixon and Monk, 2008; Monk, 2009).
With respect to the work on regional clusters, on the other hand, Pollard (2007, 380)
observes that commodity production in firms and production networks receives
much greater analytical attention than the flows of money and capital which finance
those firms and networks, and hence criticises that ‘the financial elements of the
‘‘industry in the air’’ of industrial districts have, with few exceptions, been largely
ignored’.
Against this background, this article attempts to shed further light on the relationship
between economic financialisation and regional development in the specific context of
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a regional industry cluster.1 The objective in doing so is not to take a strong moral
position on the question of the net distributional and efficiency outcomes of the
financialisation model, but rather to emphasise that the induced and cumulative effects
triggered by the expanding role of financial investors, and their practices must also
be taken into account when it comes to appraising its consequences for regional
development. This research draws on the well-established case of Munich’s film and
TV industry, which experienced a period of severe depression from 2001 onwards
related to the afore-mentioned bankruptcy of the Kirch Group (Gra¨f, 2005; Bathelt
and Gra¨f, 2008). More recently, however, the cluster appears to have recovered and
displays respectable growth in certain parts of the industry (Table 1): Whilst in
the broadcasting market the process of consolidation continues and corporate
restructuring is still on the daily agenda (as witnessed by the decreasing number
of broadcasters), the film production/post production and TV production segments
have seen a moderate net growth in the number of companies from 2004 onwards, along
with substantial growths in sales in TV production and film rental and distribution.
Furthermore, two recent surveys (Ernst & Young, 2006; IHK, 2007) as well as the
results of interviews carried out for this project with company representatives all
predict solid future prospects for the local film and TV industries.
The study in hand takes this development path as a point of departure and addresses
the setting of Munich’s film and TV industry before and after the bankruptcy of the
Kirch Group. In this way, it seeks to demonstrate the extent to which the structural
changes within the cluster are associated with both immediate and cumulative results
of the entry of new financial players and their modes of operation. The results of the
research support, at least initially, the argument that financialised practices result
in harmful outcomes at the local level. However, they also reveal that the apparent
damage caused by the forces of global finance may create the conditions for a necessary
restructuring and longer-term creative, technological and institutional revival within the
Table 1. Number of establishments and sales in Munich’s film and TV industry
2004 2005 2006
Establishments
Film production/post production 982 1027 1069
Film rental and distribution 74 76 72
Broadcasting 51 40 34
TV production (in TV studios) 61 72 85
Sales (million E)
Film production/post production 1718.7 1525.5 1302.7
Film rental and distribution 703.8 754.1 956.8
Broadcasting 3440.5 3621.0 2399.1
TV production (in TV studios) 384.7 434.7 467.7
Source: Bayerisches Landesamt fu¨r Statistik und Datenverarbeitung, 2008.
1 Clusters are regarded here—in a very general manner—as spatial concentrations of firms which cooperate
in order to solve collective action dilemmas [for a critical review of the cluster concept, see e.g. Martin and
Sunley (2006)].
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fabric of an industry cluster. The investigation thus indicates the extent to which
adjustment processes related to the entry of financial investors do not merely imply
destructive effects for a local industry cluster, but, as in this particular case, can foster
new marketing strategies and creative ideas—consequences from which both Munich’s
film and TV industry and the region as a whole could in a mid-term perspective derive
substantial benefits.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. The next section consolidates
general perspectives on financialisation as a trend fostering economic restructuring
worldwide and links these perspectives with recent conceptual advances on the
development of regional industry clusters. Section 3 then sketches the context of this
research and describes the methods applied in undertaking the empirical research.
Sections 4 and 5 present the results of the study by contrasting the situation in Munich’s
film and TV industries before and after the bankruptcy of the Kirch Group. Section 6
concludes.
2. Global finance and regional production systems: literature
review and theoretical perspectives
A prominent argument in the literature on regional clusters focuses on the
advantageous interplay of geographically proximate and distant social and economic
relations for learning and innovation (e.g. Maskell and Malmberg, 1999; Kra¨tke, 2002;
Bathelt et al., 2004; Boschma, 2005; Malmberg and Maskell, 2006). Following this
line of reasoning, research on a variety of media clusters around the globe has
untangled the significance of trans-local pipelines and the multiscalar architecture
of clusters within this industry (e.g. Scott, 2002; Bassett et al., 2003; Mossig, 2008;
compare also Faulconbridge, 2007). As a result, successful clusters are today considered
to fruitfully combine external and internal sources of knowledge in complementary
local and global networks (Table 2). Likewise, a prosperous cluster should show a
certain degree of both coherence and diversity at the same time:
In order to exist over time, a cluster has to develop and maintain a structure which enables
diversity within its area of competence, as well as a minimum of coherence in its focus.
This includes the development of a common identity surrounding a particular value chain
and the need for firms to share similar views and make similar decisions with respect to
technological choices. (Bathelt, 2005, 204)
An additional factor which has become well established being supportive for cluster
development is the ability to access funding. In this regard, e.g. Mossig (2004a) or
Glassmann (2008) have demonstrated that the availability of capital acts as a bottle-
neck for entrepreneurship and represents an essential prerequisite for the emergence
of localised, flexible and specialised production networks. Similarly, Coe’s (2000)
research on the film and TV industry in Vancouver as well as the study by Bathelt
and Gra¨f (2008)—the latter two addressed the case of Munich, too, conducting
empirical research between 2002 and 2004—have shown that cluster growth depends
to a significant extent on linkages with external markets including the co-financing
of film productions by foreign partners, whilst a lack of additional sources of finance
may limit the growth prospects of a cluster.
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Within traditional thinking, a functioning financial system enables the efficient
allocation of capital to its most productive use, thus contributing to maximise overall
wealth. This picture, however, is called into doubt by the financialisation literature in
which it is argued that the world of finance represents an independent, self-referential
world with own dynamics, values and habits, and in which the salutary function
becomes increasingly questioned. Broadly speaking, financialisation2 signifies a process
in which financial markets, agents and objectives take on an ever-increasing role in the
sum of economic, cultural and political activities within and beyond a national
economy (Epstein, 2005). This includes the growing power of financial institutions
such as private equity firms, pension funds or venture capitalists, together with the
enlargement of cross-border financial trading with a myriad of new financial products
and instruments (Engelen, 2003; Clark and Wo´jcik, 2007), as well as the dominance
of ‘shareholder value’ and ‘equity culture’ as modes of corporate governance (Froud
et al., 2000; Williams, 2000; Gibbon, 2002; Pike, 2005; Dore, 2008).
Because the large majority of the new financial intermediaries are of Anglo-Saxon
origin (see e.g. the ranking created by industry magazine Private Equity International,
called the PEI 50), financialised investment practices are frequently regarded to lead
to a greater influence of, or convergence towards, an Anglo-American way of
capitalism. Yet even though the relevance of institutional differences may have been
diminishing as a result of the rise of financial markets and the appearance of new
border-crossing financial agents, it remains a variety of capitalisms with distinctive
material and immaterial characteristics that moderates financial values and habits
(Hall and Soskice, 2001). National institutional particularities therefore remain crucial,
such as the logic of trust, commitment and loyalty in the coordinated market economy
of Germany, as opposed to the less committed, liberal Anglo-American system
(Christopherson, 2002; Engelen, 2003; Clark and Wo´jcik, 2005; Wo´jcik, 2006; Engelen
and Grote, this issue).
But financialisation is not only a force that transforms corporate governance at
the national scale; it also affects regional economies, their production structure and
their spheres of actors, that is, owners, employees, banks and suppliers. Against this
background, the influence of finance on the coherence, diversity and development of
regional clusters becomes more ambiguous than in the traditional understanding of
the financial system. The entrance of new financial players into regional production
clusters impacts on these complexes by reshaping their coherence and diversity in
differing ways (Table 3). On one hand, the entry of new financial agents may pose
distinct problems to regional economies by disrupting the particular value chain and the
local collectively competitive context. The control of focal companies by new financial
intermediaries implies a potential tension between principles and agency incentives,
2 The term is used in different ways, with no consensus on a definition (e.g. Milberg, 2008; Engelen and
Konings, Forthcoming): For a first group of scholars, financialisation refers to a pattern of accumulation
in which profit making occurs increasingly through financial channels rather than through trade and
commodity production or; in other words, the shift in corporate activities from the production and
distribution of goods and services to the trading of financial assets; for others, in a more narrow use of the
term, financialisation implies the dominance of ‘shareholder value’ as a mode of corporate governance, or
a growing dominance of capital market financial systems over bank-based financial systems; in yet
another interpretation financialisation corresponds to the increasing power of a financial institution,
including the enlargement of cross-border financial trading, with a myriad of new financial products and
instruments—a trend which is reflected, for instance, in the growing importance of pension funds.
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through which localised value-creation and learning processes become subordinate
to demands for short-term profitability (Asheim and Herstad, 2003). In this context,
the tremendous growth of the private equity industry has provoked concerns among
a variety of economic and political commentators.3 Most notably, these investors
are accused of destroying long-term value in their portfolio companies, with conse-
quences for local and regional development such as the disembedding of the regional
social relations of ownership and control, caused by the concentration of shareholdings
among institutional investors.
Furthermore, financialised actors and practices may also disturb the common
identity and coherence of a cluster when trust-based relations are replaced by market-
based relations. After the entrance of new players, for example, online banks and
formerly non-financial companies such as Virgin, General Electric or Porsche, which
began to target particular segments of the financial markets, traditional banks were
forced to reconfigure their market approach and centralise their organisational
structure. After a decade of branch closing and the development of business fields
such as investment banking, SMEs, in particular, face more and more difficulties
in obtaining bank loans (Leyshon and Thrift, 1997; Tickell, 2000; Pollard, 2003;
Table 3. Financialised capital and regional development
Financialised actors/practices Regional development consequences
(De-localised) loan finance Trust-based relations are replaced by market-based relations
Break-up of regional networks
New marketing strategies of local banks due to greater competition
Venture finance Firm foundation and increase of innovative firms
Development of new technologies/market niches
Intermediation between start-ups and established firms
Forced engagement in capital markets
Capital market/equity finance Supply of capital/equity may preserve suffering companies
Restructuring, implementation of new management techniques,
efficiency orientation etc. (hands-on investments)
Revaluation and recombination of (local) assets
Changing power relations (including loss of independence)
Access to global networks
3 Between 1985 and 2005, private equity funds experienced an average annual growth rate of 18.5%. In
2007, a record of more than US$ 680 billion of private equity was invested globally, up over a third on the
previous year and more than twice the total invested in 2005 (Private Equity Online, 2008). The private
equity industry consists, on one hand, of a rather small number of large funds which are in part publicly
listed, and on the other hand of a large number of smaller, unlisted companies (Froud and Williams,
2007). Private equity firms acquire a controlling or substantial minority interest in a company and then
attempt to maximize the value of that investment through different arrangements. In general, they receive
a return on their investments through public offerings or the re-selling of their stakes to other (investment)
companies.
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Klagge, 2004). Since regional banking systems play an important role in overcoming
information asymmetries (e.g. Alessandrini and Zazzaro, 1999), this development
implies potentially harmful consequences for regional development.
On the other hand, the agendas of the different groups of financial investors,
including investment banks and private equity firms, have the net effect of encouraging
an economy of permanent restructuring (Folkmann et al., 2007). Hence, the emergence
of new agents and practices as well as the establishment of new trans-local linkages
serve as powerful means of preventing or breaking out of declining to ‘locked-in’ modes
of production. Firm ownership patterns and levels of capital stock are seen as central
in enabling companies to change the scope and scale of their relationships. A change
of ownership implies significant effects on the firms involved and their environments.
As Chapman (2003, 315) notes ‘[c]hanges in ownership modify the internal structure
and re-define the external relationships of the acquiring firm’, and they ‘allow the
acquiring company to escape from many of the constraints which limited the freedom
of the seller’ (ibid, 323). Thus, foreign ownership can complement local cooperation
or learning processes and permit investments which, through their interplay with the
regional institutional context and industrial structure, emerge as value creating, that
is, supporting or correcting the basic logic of value creation or knowledge exploration
and exploitation.
Further positive impacts may arise from venture capitalists and the fast-growing
amount of risk capital being used to support the formation of new companies (e.g.
Martin et al., 2002). Venture capitalists support start-ups and new businesses in their
early stages, providing not only capital, but also advice and contacts, and have
a major influence on management decisions (Hellmann and Puri, 2000). With regard
to the dynamics of the interplay between the availability of venture finance and new
firm formation, Saxenian (1994) has shown that, contrary to popular belief, the venture
capital industry in Silicon Valley emerged out of the region’s base of technology
enterprises, and not vice versa. As successful entrepreneurs reinvested their capital
in promising local start-ups, they created a new and different kind of financial
institution (compare also Cooke, 2002; Powell et al., 2002; Zook, 2002). In this sense,
venture capital can be regarded as a distinct form of local finance, operating within
global conventions.
In sum, financialisation is to be seen as a two-edged sword: it can result in positive
impacts such as improved economies of time, allocative efficiency, intensified
competition and greater openness—up to a threshold. Beyond this point, it derails
the economic development of a regional cluster by destroying shared resources and
long-term learning constellations. To appraise the behaviour of financial institutions
thus becomes an issue of the context in which their influence unfolds. The question that
arises is whether financialised capitalism can contribute to changes in a region’s
structural setting or institutional arrangement, including its coherence, diversity or
internal and external relations. Concerning this matter, it has to be taken into account
that clusters are embedded hybrids, wherein parts of the system adapt to new situations
and other parts persist. Change in these systems can occur when paths collide—not
necessarily violently—such as with the translation of foreign production methods into
regional production systems (Gertler, 2004). Following this multi-trajectory perspec-
tive, the subsequent sections of this article exemplify the complexity of the consequences
of financialised investment practices taking the media industry in Munich as an
illustrative case.
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3. Specification of analysis
The growth of Munich’s film and TV cluster in the post-war period has been influenced
by a number of factors such as the historical roots of the industry4 and differing
means of public support.5 Of particular relevance has been the liberalisation of the
market in 1984; since then the structure of the German TV market is shaped by the
co-existence of public and private broadcasters (e.g. Mossig, 2004b). The public
broadcasters include nine regional channels and two channels broadcasting nationwide
(ARD and ZDF). They are financed from fees paid by TV and radio owners. In 2007,
public broadcasters accounted for close to 45% of the viewing public. In contrast,
private broadcasters generate most of their revenue from advertising, and the private
market is dominated by a group of channels that belong to two distinct corporate
groups: the RTL Group in Cologne, owned by the fully integrated internationally
operating media conglomerate Bertelsmann AG, as well as the Munich-based
ProSiebenSat.1 Media AG.
Munich’s film and TV industry, that is, broadcasting, film/TV production, distri-
bution and services, employs 16,000 people overall (Ernst & Young, 2006; IHK,
2007). In spatial terms, the industry is highly concentrated in Unterfo¨hring/Ismaning,
about 10 km north-east of the city centre, and in Gru¨nwald-Geiselgasteig which is
about the same distance to the south of the centre (Figure 1). The city centre, on the
other hand, hosts a large number of specialised training and funding organisations
such as the MediaCampus Bavaria or the Bavarian Film and TV Fund, which provide
a unique institutional infrastructure. The regional public broadcaster, Bayerischer
Rundfunk, and a number of productions and distribution firms—Constantin Film and
Tandem Communications, for instance—are also located in the centre.
4 As in other industrialized countries, the German media industry is highly concentrated in urban centers,
namely Berlin/Babelsberg, Cologne, Hamburg and Munich. This spatial concentration relates primarily
to the historical development of the industry. Until the 1940s, Germany had one of the strongest and most
productive feature film industries in the world. The industry seized that position not least because of its
collaboration with the Third Reich regime and consequently, after gaining control over Germany, the
Allies prohibited filmmaking in the immediate aftermath of the war. The subsequent restructuring
followed different processes in each of the four occupation zones. The Soviets sponsored the
reconstitution of a film making monopoly in their zone of occupation and established German Film
AG (DEFA) in Babelsberg. The British military government focused mainly on the broadcasting industry
and supported the establishment of relatively small production infrastructures, which later developed into
leading public broadcasting corporations in Hamburg and Cologne. In contrast, the US authorities
initially showed reluctance to license any German filmmakers in their zone of occupation, but used their
position as victors to open up Europe to Hollywood movie products (e.g. Shandley, 1999; Kaiser and
Licke, 2007).
5 Support for the industry is offered from different levels of government, that is, from the state, federal and
European levels. This support can be characterized either as specific sectoral infrastructural measures (e.g.
provision of office space or studio halls as in the case of the establishment of the Bavarian Film Center in
Geiselgasteig, or public support of specific events or organisations) or the direct financial promotion of
film productions. Concerning the latter, the German government implemented a film promotion agency
(Filmfo¨rderungsanstalt, FFA) in 1968, and in the late-1970s and early-1980s the state governments
followed up with public film funding. By ensuring that a certain multiple of the support (in Bavaria, for
instance, this quota amounts to 150%) was spent locally, these funds provided support to almost all
aspects of film production, including for instance script writing, distribution, professional training and
cinematographic festivals. The combined film funding provided by the national and state government
exceeds E200 million per annum (Kurp, 2004). European funding adds to this, playing however a rather
minor role (in 2005, for instance, the German market received a share of less than E10 million from the
European media plus program).
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According to the results of the research on the internal and external dynamics
of Munich’s film and TV cluster by Bathelt and Gra¨f (2008, 1955–1957), this frag-
mented territorial distribution limits the opportunities for informal communication and
information flows also referred to as ‘local buzz’. There is, however, an exceptionally
high degree of functional and organisational interconnectivity within Munich’s film
and TV industry: Bayerischer Rundfunk, for example, is not only present in the city,
but has broadcasting and production sites in Unterfo¨hrung, too. Another example is
Bavaria Studios, one of the largest service providers of film and television production
facilities in Europe, which maintains studios in both Unterfo¨hring (eight studios),
where it also holds its principal office, and Geiselgasteig (10 studios). As regards the
ownership structure, Bavaria Studios is owned by Bayerische Landesbank, ZDF, and
Bavaria Film in Geiselgasteig, who each hold 33.3% of the company, while Bavaria
Studios in turn is itself owner of SetLogistics, a film service company in Geiselgasteig.
The two following sections of this article shed further light on these preliminary
observations and address the organisational relationships in the landscape of Munich’s
film and TV industry by comparing the situations before and after the bankruptcy
of the Kirch Group. Methodologically, the research was approached as a case study,
combining literature review and the compilation of company and cluster information
from various sources, together with qualitative interviews. In detail, the work involved
three analytical steps. In the first step, different sources of information were used to
Figure 1. Location of broadcasters, important production companies and institutions related
to film and TV in Munich, 2008.
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identify all of the players in Munich’s audiovisual industry. In the second step,
a detailed scheme was drawn up for each of the identified companies to illustrate
their ownership structures and the way these had changed over time, using information
available through inspection of the commercial registers. Finally, in the third step,
the role of changing ownership and finance was explored through 38 semi-structured
interviews with film production and service companies, broadcasters, private and
public financiers, and other supporting institutions in summer 2007 and spring 2008.6
With regard to the impact of changing equity and ownership structures, the schematic
recording of shareholdings proved helpful in ensuring that none of those interviewed
needed to worry about divulging anything that was not already in the public domain.
This procedure corresponds to Gra¨f ’s (2005, 22) observation that studying finance
in the media industry has to be seen as an especially challenging task in terms of data
availability and sensitivity.
4. Setting of Munich’s film and TV industry before the Kirch crisis
The development of the film and TV industry in Munich during the post-war
period was closely connected to the formation of two distinct, rather closed corporate
networks. These two networks are highlighted in Figure 2 which displays the owner-
ship structures of the most significant part of Munich’s film and TV industry just
before the collapse of the Kirch empire. While there were initially interconnections
between these two networks, over the ensuing decades they became less intertwined.
The first integrated network was that of the previously mentioned regional public
broadcaster Bayerischer Rundfunk, including its shareholding of the Bavaria Film
Group.7 Bayerischer Rundfunk was established in Munich in 1950 as one of nine
regional TV stations in the federal structure of the ARD, the cooperative association
of public broadcasters in Germany. As licensing fees are allocated according to the
population of the La¨nder—Bavaria is Germany’s second most populous province
(after North Rhine-Westphalia or NRW)—and regional broadcasters are, in return,
obliged to respectively contribute to the common program of ARD, Munich as well
as Cologne in NRW were able to establish a strong infrastructure for TV production
at an early stage (Mossig, 2004b).
The establishment of ZDF’s regional studio in the 1960s gave further impetus to
the growth of the media industry in Munich. Since they received a lower degree of
public funding, ZDF was forced to adopt a less integrated strategy than Bayerischer
Rundfunk and worked mainly in partnership with independent producers. This laid
the foundation for the rise of Leo Kirch’s media empire, eventually becoming the
second rigid network in Munich’s media landscape. Kirch launched his business in
6 The interviews were conducted with either one or two corporate executives in conference rooms in the
companies’ locations and usually lasted between 75 and 90min. All interviews were digitally recorded,
transcribed and condensed into a matrix scheme for analysis.
7 The Bavaria Film Group, based on the tradition of a studio company founded in 1919 in Geiselgasteig,
has steadily grown to become a group of more than 30 subsidiaries and shareholdings, among them the
well-known Bavaria Studios in Filmstadt Geiselgasteig in the South of Munich. Bayerischer Rundfunk
has held shares in the Bavaria Film Group since the 1990s. Two other regional public broadcasters (SWR
and WDR) took up interests in the Group back in the 1950s—a period when the cinema industry
dominated the German entertainment market and followed the agreement ‘No meter film for the TV
market’.
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the 1950s with the establishment of two distribution companies Beta Film and Taurus
Film. Initially, their main customers were ARD and, above all, ZDF. As a consequence,
the two public broadcasters neglected to build up their own comprehensive film
libraries, and Kirch was then able to substantially increase prices. Furthermore, with
the liberalisation of the national TV market in the 1980s and the entry of new players,
the market for his products broadened. In order to secure his trade channels, Kirch
quickly took out shares in the new market participants and integrated further levels
of the value chain into his corporate group, systematically following the vision of
a fully integrated media complex (Kiefer, 2003). He was one of the three founders of
the Sat.1 channel in Berlin, and via his son Thomas Kirch established ProSieben in
Munich, followed in the 1990s by Kabel1 (initially Der Kabelkanal, from 2005 onwards
kabel eins), and the sports channel DSF. Kirch also forced his way into the pay-TV
sector by means of a shareholding in Premiere as sole supplier in this segment of the
market, the remaining interests being held by Bertelsmann and the French Canal Plus.
Figure 2. Corporate ownership in Munich’s film and TV industry, 2002.
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In 1996, Kirch established DF1 as the first digital pay-TV channel in Germany (Woldt,
2002). In 1998, when European and German cartel commissions prevented Kirch
and Bertelsmann from implementing a common pay-TV platform, Bertelsmann sold
his shares in Premiere to Kirch, who then merged DF1 and Premiere into Premiere
World.
At the height of its growth, the Kirch Group was valued at E5.6 billion and
employed close to 9500 staff, compared to a workforce of 3100 at Bayerischer
Rundfunk (including radio broadcasting). Thanks to this position as an important
employer and close personal ties of Kirch to highest level politicians, the group was
also strongly interwoven with government (e.g. BBC, 2002). Apart from the private
channels mentioned previously, its 150 units included a number of TV production
companies, the biggest film library in Europe, rights to two World Cup soccer
competitions and a significant share of the Formula One car-racing license (Formatt,
2005; IHT, 2007).
In this environment of rigid networks, the broadcasters held the most powerful
position in the value chain. The majority of TV productions were financed either
solely by broadcasters or via combined financing from broadcasters and public film
funds or the financial resources of production companies.8 That is, the public
broadcasters or private channels supplied the budget and in return obtained all rights
to the production. Until 2002, dependent production companies, that is, companies
with 25% or more of their shares held by another organisation, accounted for close
to 50% of the overall production volume (Formatt, 2005, 30). For the typically small
and medium-sized production companies, bank loans following the specific German
Hausbank principle (‘relationship lending’, cf. Schamp, 2003; Klagge and Martin, 2005)
served as the primary source for additional funding and bridging finance requirements
(Cleve´, 1997; Glassmann, 2008). International co-productions and internationally
co-financed projects have in comparison been very rare.
To a large extent, this characteristic also holds true for the local motion-picture
industry: notwithstanding substantially higher budgets and a more complex financial
value chain—that is, higher risk taking, which is usually shared among a greater
number of investors—network dynamics within the Munich feature film industry
are particularly intense within a relatively small group of local organisations. The
most notable of these organisations are Constantin Film and Bavaria Studios. It was
only in the manufacture of technical equipment used in the production process that
Munich-based firms held a leading position in the world market (ARRI for camera
equipment is the classic example). As far as production, financing and distribution
are concerned, the Munich feature film industry has been only marginally integrated
into the global industry (Kaiser and Liecke, 2007).
Overall, by the end of the 1990s, Munich’s film and TV industry was in a situation
with a high degree of mutual interdependence at the local level and underdeveloped
links to external markets. The low orientation towards external sources of knowledge
prevented substantial growth impulses to the region. With the boom of the New
Economy and the high level of local and domestic demand, there was also no real need
to develop new ideas or marketing strategies. Against this background of vulnerability,
8 The supportive public funding instruments were, however, established only in the second half of the 1990s
(FFF in 1996, Bankenfonds in 2000).
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it was not surprising that the economic downturn at the beginning of the new
millennium along with a significant reduction in advertising expenditure brought
tremendous challenges to the cluster.
5. Regeneration of the cluster in the paradigm of global finance
The massive expansion strategy of the Kirch Group imposed a high level of demand
for capital. In particular, the foray into the pay-TV segment, in which Kirch
attempted to establish pay-TV in Germany single-handedly following the rejection of
the joint proposals with Bertelsmann, turned out to be extremely costly. In the spring
of 2002, Kirch’s empire finally collapsed with debts amounting to E10 billion—the
largest company bankruptcy in German history thus far. The Bayerische Landesbank,
half-owned by the state of Bavaria, was Kirch’s biggest bank creditor, holding E1.9
billion in Kirch loans, the other main creditors being all the leading German
commercial banks (Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, Commerzbank, HVB, DZ Bank)
as well as Lehmann Brothers and JP Morgan (BBC, 2002). Among the shareholders,
all losing their investments, were also Mediaset owned by Silvio Berlusconi as well
as Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp, both of them displayed interests to buy certain
units of the group, most notably ProSiebenSat.1.
Much of the German business and political establishment attempted to prevent
the arrival of even more powerful foreign media barons and favoured a German
solution; notwithstanding, after several months of negotiations involving a broad
range of stakeholders including state and national governments, in the end, when the
last rival suitor Heinrich Bauer Verlag, a German publisher which already owned part
of RTL and whose bid would have put the deal under antitrust scrutiny, decided to
pull out, it was the group of strategic investors around US media mogul Haim Saban
that succeeded in acquiring ProSiebenSat.1. In the following, the section first describes
the immediate effects of the arrival of this new agent and his financialised modes
of operation with regard to the restructuring of ProSiebenSat.1 as well as the adjust-
ment process that followed in the industry. It then places the restructuring of the
industry into the broader regional context.
5.1. Dissolution of the Kirch group and corporate restructuring under Saban
and KKR/Permira
Haim Saban’s acquisition of ProSiebenSat.1 Media AG, including the four channels
ProSieben, Kabel1, Sat.1 and N24 (the latter two by now still located in Berlin9) which
together account for 40% of the nationwide TV-advertising market, significantly
altered the German TV landscape. For the first time, a foreign group of financial
investors had gained control of an important German player. In coverage by the
international press, the deal was called a transforming moment in German television
that brought ‘a shrewd, bare-knuckles Hollywood operator to a market dominated
by the state and by family-owned companies like Bertelsmann’ (NYT, 2003), that is,
9 In November 2008, ProSiebenSat.1 indeed announced that by June 2009, Sat.1, ProSieben and kabel eins
shall all be located together in a new structure in Munich, thus combining all the German Group’s
general-interest stations in a single building at a single site. Sat.1 and all support functions will be
relocated from Berlin. The plan affects a total of 350 employees.
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the injection of someone with a very different background and outlook into what
had been a rather insular business.
Within the company, the change of ownership resulted in the replacement of
management executives and further job losses. Pursuing a strategy of diversification,
ProSiebenSat.1 under Saban aimed to broaden its focus by means of both organic
growth (i.e. intensifying the expansions into merchandising and the new media
segment), and also by the acquisition of a number of smaller new media companies
such as the video community ‘MyVideo’ or the social network ‘Lokalisten’. Together
with cost-cutting measures that included an overall loss of more than 300 jobs
between 2002 and 2005, the turnaround and growth strategy initiated by the new
owner proved fairly successful, with considerable increases in sales, market share
and net income (Table 4). As a result, Saban was able to make a profitable sale
of his shares to an investment fund controlled by the private equity firms Permira
and Kohlberg Kravis Roberts (KKR) in December 2006. Thereupon, ProSiebenSat.1
Media AG acquired SBS Broadcasting (from then onwards ProSiebenSat.1 Group),
another portfolio company controlled by Permira and KKR, for a total consideration
of E3.3 billion. Due to this acquisition being fully financed externally, the debts of
ProSiebenSat.1 increased to about E3.6 billion and, as a result of the burden of debt
servicing, profits decreased by two thirds to E89 million. Nevertheless, the group
increased dividends for both common and preferred stocks and distributed a E270
million payout to the shareholders.
One point that interviewees highlighted when describing the changing modes of
corporate governance from Kirch to Saban—‘from a surely family-orientated company
to a transparent, shareholder-driven corporation’10 (Broadcaster BC4, July 2007)—was
the implementation of English as the corporate language. Furthermore, ProSiebenSat.1
switched its accounting and reporting system and since 2003 has compiled its
annual and quarterly reports in accordance with the international financial reporting
Table 4. Basic data on ProSiebenSat.1 Media AG/group, 2001–2007
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007a
Sales (million E) 2015 1895 1807 1834 1990 2095 2703
Net income (million E) 74 15 45 134 221 241 89
Employees 3029 3072 2781 2899 2730 3097 5930
Dividend common stock (E) 0.14 – – 0.28 0.82 0.87 1.23
Dividend preferred stock (E) 0.16 0.02 0.02 0.30 0.84 0.89 1.25
Payout (million E) 29 1.9 1.9 63.5 181.6 192.5 269.9
Payout ratiob (%) 39.2 13.0 4.9 47.5 82.2 80.0 303.3
Stock price 31.12.c (E) 5.75 6.50 13.25 13.50 16.35 24.85 16.39
aIncluding the results of SBS Broadcasting Group, acquired by ProSieben Sat.1 in June 2007.
bCompared to consolidated profit for the year.
cISIN (International Securities Identification Number): DE0007771172.
Sources: Corporate annual reports, Onvista.
10 Quotes from interview translated by the author.
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standards IFRS, whereas previously they had conformed to the German commercial
code HGB. Another point to make in this context is that the entry of new players and
the reconfiguration of ownership structures involved an augmented transfer of external
knowledge that complemented the local knowledge base. In a perspective of 5 years’
distance, one interviewee who worked with Kirch until the bankruptcy and is now
a deputy director with a rival broadcaster described these beneficial effects as follows:
I experienced it when Haim Saban took over at that time and came along with his team. As a
person he was very likeable—I met him twice—but what a massive clean out he implemented
in that store . . . and of course he brought in his people from all over, with the result that,
suddenly, Munich was the ‘place to be’. (Broadcaster BC5, July 2007)
Moving on, he then commented on the recent takeover of SBS by ProSiebenSat.1
Media AG:
This [i.e. re-emergence of the location] has reciprocal effects. If KKR and Permira now build
an important pan-European media corporation here, this will be of utmost importance for
Munich as a centre for the industry, much more important than the period of superiority
of the regional public broadcasters, i.e. the time when public broadcasting was far more
powerful and Bayerischer Rundfunk was leading the way here in Munich. (Broadcaster BC5,
July 2007)
Other interviewees were however more critical of the increased presence of international
‘consultants’, that is, executives of the equity firms involved and their self-referential
behaviour. For instance, it was repeatedly reported that the investors put massive
pressures on their target companies by playing them off against each other–with
statements like ‘You tell us prices are going down, but just two hours ago when
we visited your competitor [also hold by this investor] we were told that prices are
stable’. Then again, the same interviewees accredited these consultants for disseminat-
ing the knowledge they gained from previous investments in other contexts. These
divergent valuations provide a first indication of the ambiguous effects that financial
investors and their globalising practices may have on agglomerated production
complexes and their performance. It is this ambiguity to which is turned in more
detail now.
5.2. Situating the restructuring of ProSiebenSat.1 in the context of the industry
The facts given on the case of ProSiebenSat.1, including its re-sale from one financial
investor to the next, exemplify the dynamic restructuring and increasing overall
impact of (foreign) financial players on the media landscape in Munich. Figure 3, in
which ownership is sketched out for 2008, aims to display these developments. The
illustration highlights the broadcasters and production companies, which have
experienced major changes in shareholder structure since 2002. In addition, the entry
of a number of further financial investors such as Providence Equity, 3i, Wellington,
or the Canadian pension fund OTPP becomes apparent. Although the number of film
and TV companies under foreign control still accounts for only a smaller percentage
of the total in absolute terms (IHK, 2007, 21), when measured in terms of the local
workforce employed by the acquired companies, the influence of these financial
investors has definitely reached a significant level.
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The following statement from one of the film producers interviewed illustrates the
uncertainties under which the Munich film and TV industry has had to operate since
these changes have occurred:
At the private channels, and of course most of all at ProSiebenSat.1, the bankruptcy of Kirch
has caused considerable disruption. So did the consolidation by Saban which, for sure, was
reasonable, but from the beginning everyone knew that this would not be a strategic
partnership for 25 years, but a financial investment. From the first day with Saban it was clear
that we were all operating within a timetable of only three or four years. (Film producer FP7,
August 2007)
In this competitive environment of restructuring and high volatility, a range of
adjustments took place. First of all, the majority of the commercial banks dismissed
the media sector and became very restrictive towards clients in this segment. The
implementation of the Basel II accord forcing banks to impose more strict requirements
Figure 3. Corporate ownership in Munich’s film and TV industry, 2008.
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and demand greater security for loans reinforced this development and, as a result, only
two banks continued to invest in the media market, namely the nationwide operating
DZ Bank and local Reuschel Bank. The years 2003 and 2004 were the most difficult
for film and TV producers and also for the service companies. At the national level,
2003 saw a net gain of 70 new independent producers, while in 2004, almost the
same number of companies vanished and the overall number fell back to the level of
2002.11
A number of former Kirch production units and service firms bought out by
their management were however able to survive and coped fairly successfully with
the situation, for example, Neue Deutsche Filmgesellschaft (NDF), Plazamedia and
Janus TV. While overall, Munich became a preferred location for higher-budget and
rather capital-intensive productions, these companies were forced to adopt heavy
cost-cutting measures, which included a shift in terms of content towards documentary
and infotainment, both of which require lower budgets than movie production.
An increasing number of productions were also moved to cheaper locations such
as Berlin or Leipzig or were now produced by subcontractors and in cooperation
with, for instance, Eastern European partners, in order to achieve cost advantages.
That apart, the newly achieved independence permitted access to new clients and
thus enabled an escape from the rigid constraints of the Kirch empire.
Field evidence suggests, however, that the networks of personal contacts in the
industry persisted by and large, or even became strengthened over the crises period,
as both new entrants as well as experienced agents observed:
It was very uncommon when we, as young producers, entered the tight market with the desire
to produce commercial entertainment. Nobody was keen to get to know new people as
everybody was just trying to keep the old boys’ network alive. But then we saw our chance
lying exactly in this restructuring of the old system which had no future anyway. We had
to attract the people through more work, creativity and better ideas—that was our plan. (Film
producer FP6, August 2007)
No doubt, our relationship with those guys [at ProSiebenSat.1] is much better than their
relationship with their new shareholders. When such a financial investor tries to talk to them,
he will not get through, whereas when we talk to them we do get through, because our
relationship is based on trust. (Broadcaster BC1, August 2007)
On one hand, these observations illustrate the substantial tensions and the potential
for agency problems at the interface between the two distinct business systems
of the financial investor and its target company. On the other hand, they highlight
the extent to which the institutional particularities of a cluster, such as the common
identity and the sharing of views, are still maintained in Munich’s film and TV industry
and that the commitment and coherence previously developed prevail in the industry.
That is, the trajectory of the cluster is observably marked by junctures of this
nature, where persistent local paths interact with new dynamics at the local and the
global scale.
11 Correspondingly, the share of the production volume (in minutes) for dependent producers decreased
from the afore-mentioned figure of 50% to 32% and 34%, respectively for 2003 and 2004 (Formatt,
2005).
Global finance and the development of regional clusters . 715
5.3. Situating the restructuring of the industry in the wider context
of the region
As regards the cumulative effects of the adjustment processes within the film and
TV industry on Munich’s regional economy as a whole, a first important point to
make is the gaining role of certain market niches, which were less well developed
during the Kirch era, but developed only in the paradigm of global finance. First, a
number of firms could have been established that became leading European addresses
for international co-productions of specific television programs and formats (e.g.
miniseries).12 With English language productions addressing themes, which are aimed
to be commercially viable not only in Germany, but also in, for example, Italy,
Japan and North America, and funding arrangements that usually include a variety
of foreign partners, these firms have strengthened the international orientation of
the location. Furthermore, the IPTV market13 and the games sector14, that is, the
digitalisation-driven and technology oriented parts of the industry, experienced
considerable growth. As a result, Munich is today acknowledged as one of the leading
technological centres of the media industry in Germany.
A contributing factor to this development and the technological prominence has
been the availability of venture capital. In addition to the overall attractiveness of
Munich for venture capital and risk investors, as one of Germany’s most important
financial centres, several former Kirch executives who were very successful during
the boom of the 1990s established investment companies with a specific focus on
media technologies. To overcome the lack of available finance in the immediate post-
bankruptcy years, they played a significant role in terms of catalysing new commercial
ideas. That is, the rise and entry of new financial agents has allowed escaping from
former constraints, an observation which again demonstrates the ambivalent outcomes
of financialisation. Not least, these investors contributed to set up new collaborations
and thus potential constellations of learning, as the following explanation of one of
the interviewed venture capitalists indicates:
We were not able to make [Firm X] take-off in 2003—this was a very difficult time—as we
could not find a financier. Not one. But then I went to Firm Y [another venture firm
in Munich], with which I already had a well-established relationship. I told them: ‘Trust me,
I believe in these guys, they are able to do it and there is a niche in the market as well’. Then
I said: ‘If you join, I will then look for additional investors.’ Later, when the investment was
established and the task was to foster its growth requiring a second round of financing, their
network helped to get Firm Z [a third venture capital firm] from Paris into the boat. They
already knew each other from two or three other projects they had done together. (Investor
IN4, August 2007)
12 Among the prominent examples of new, internationally oriented companies are Tandem
Communications, founded by two former ProSieben executives, and Bavariapool International
Coproductions, established in 2007 as subsidiary of Bavaria and Telepool, each holding 50%.
13 IPTV is a system where a digital television service is delivered using Internet Protocol (IP) over a
network infrastructure, which includes delivery by a broadband connection.
14 Not least, ProSiebenSat.1 itself has intensified its activities in the games segment and in 2007 agreed
on cooperation with US producer ZeniMax. Since the acquisition of SBS, ProSiebenSat.1 holds a 9%
minority stake in ZeniMax.
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Stimuli to pool different agents also came from the local banks that remained in
the market. Driven by the incentive to serve potential future customers, they have
since provided free-of-charge advisory services including the offer to introduce
young producers, such as the graduates from Munich’s University for Television and
Film HFF, to more established, financially sound production companies. Within the
framework of this so-called ‘Patronatsmodell’ producers can, in the event of a
successful introduction, develop their project ideas as junior partners, in return for
either a fee or shares in the company.15 During fieldwork, new-generation interviewees
conceded an increasingly open attitude towards external funding and the inclusion of
strategic partners, providing evidence that the traditionally rather sceptical attitude
towards co-determination is softening more and more within the industry. Through this
means, a number of today’s successful, internationally oriented companies were able
to be established, in some cases, even at the expense of retaining only a minority
stake (compare also Figure 3, again).
All in all, the dissolution of the Kirch Group forced the full range of agents
in the local media market—from former Kirch units and established companies, to
banks and entrepreneurs—to rethink their business strategies and to open themselves
up to innovative marketing and financial models. The resulting emergence of new
configurations and learning situations rejuvenated Munich’s film and TV industry
and produced new relations within the regional, national and international arenas. Even
though for certain parts of the industry, particularly, the former Kirch units including
the ProSiebenSat.1 Group, the situation remains extremely tense within the control
of financial investors, overall, the crisis and the entry of new players has in the
meantime been widely acknowledged for its beneficial market-adjustment forces.
Notwithstanding all the short- or long-term forces of financial institutions, the
most important factors for running a successful business within a cultural industry
remain ideas and creativity. Thus, the challenge is to further develop and implement
financing models that allow the creative potential of industrial entrepreneurs to
be realised—a mission which is demanding not only in economical, but also in social
and cultural terms. Given the shortage of bank liquidity and the increased costs of
capital at the present, the international industry concedes that in the current climate
‘with credit tighter than a Jason Bourne action sequence . . . and equity investors
now a rare breed’ (Masters and Kemp, 2009) film financing might require new
approaches. Having just emerged from a painful restructuring, those who survived
in Munich’s film and TV industry are likely to be more case-hardened and better
placed to handle the challenges presented by the current crisis.
6. Conclusions
This article has addressed the role of financial capital in relation to the development
of a regional industry cluster. In doing so, it has revealed that the association between
a local economy’s integration into the global capitalist system, and its development
performance is less straightforward than the current public and political arguments
concerning the effects of financialisation and new financial agents might pretend.
15 In co-financed productions, in contrast, the partners involved provide capital in exchange for a portion
of the profits and movie rights.
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Drawing on the case of Munich’s film and TV industry following the crisis related to
the insolvency of the Kirch Group in 2002, this research contributes to the literature
on cluster development in two main ways. As a start, and most simply, the results
demonstrate the extent to which changing ownership and the entry of financial
investors such as KKR/Permira may cause immediate harmful effects to the companies
involved and to their surroundings, thus supporting the prevalent suspicion of external
control and the short-term profit orientation of certain players in contemporary
financialised capitalism.
In addition, the research exemplifies the cumulative effects of new financialised
practices within the specific fabric of an industry cluster. The investigation revealed
the extent to which, in this particular case, the industry has indeed benefited from
the impetus created by new financial investors, most notably the turnaround under
Haim Saban, through the initiation of new learning constellations, the encouragement
of a stronger international orientation and the creation of new, alternative, industry-
specific financial instruments. That is, financialised practices provided the means to
break out of the locked-in modes of productions within Munich’s particular
institutional arrangements during the Kirch era. They set in train moves to foster
entrepreneurship, including greater openness to new means of finance such as the
indicated Patronatsmodell, and resulted in a more diversified situation today. In this
regard, it is important to place the impact of the restructuring of the industry into
the wider context of the development of the region. In the present case, the dissolution
of the Kirch Group and the investments of financial agents in the local broadcasting
corporation not only affected the film and TV market, but the consequential
restructuring also contributed to a collateral reinforcement of the whole location,
including a strengthening of both the local financial sector and internet/new media
segments.
Taken together, this study of Munich’s film and TV industry illustrates the extent
to which an examination of the complexity of the development consequences of
financialised capitalism adds to our understanding of the development of regional
clusters. Reconstituted financial structures and ownership relations either immediately
emerge as value creating, to the extent that these changes encourage new investments,
new actor constellations and new growth opportunities in previously less prominent
technologies, or they strain a local economy and also its social cohesion. However,
even in the latter case, the immediate effects must be contrasted against the longer-
term, cumulative benefits which may result from these pressures, such as the
re-grouping of existing unique skills and resources, better access to external sources
of knowledge and, not least, a greater ability to foster linkages around the globe. In
other words, while financialisation doubtlessly implies harmful adjustment processes
due to an increased focus on shareholder value and the requirements of the global
capitalist system, it may at the same time support—at least in an environment of general
economic strength, as it is the case in Munich—the renaissance of traditional economic
virtues such as entrepreneurial spirit, greater risk taking and increased innovative
power. Note, however, that these impacts are highly context specific; supposedly, the
positive effects observed here may occur only in rather successful regions in the global
economy core, while for less well endowed regions other results should be expected.
Irrespective of this context-related ambiguity, the present case circumstantiates that
financialisation does not necessarily imply convergence towards an Anglo-American
style of capitalism. Instead, the emergence of financialised modes of operation goes
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hand in hand with new institutional paths and hybrid configurations. This is related
to the fact that the trajectory of a cluster is marked by multiple junctions and
the interaction of dynamic local and global developments. The study of financial
practices and relations provides a promising approach to the untangling of these
junctions and interactions. In this sense, money not only flows like mercury, but can
also be regarded representing a mercury—in the sense of a messenger—for knowledge,
ideas and creativity within clusters and beyond, tracing valuable paths to be further
followed.
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